Abstract-Bag-of-words deception detection systems outperform humans, but are still not always accurate enough to be useful. In interrogation settings, the language of questions influences the language of responses. We develop a technique to correct for such influences and apply it to question-andanswer datasets. Surprisingly, such correction is not sufficientthose being deceptive react to prompting words in qualitatively different ways to those telling the truth. Accurate detection of deception in interrogation settings therefore requires modelling word use in both questions and answers.
From court cases to airport security, many high-stakes realworld situations rely on the human ability to detect who is deceptive and who is not but, sadly, human ability in this area is poor. Automating deception detection would bring many benefits: it could be used to augment human judgement in high-stakes situations, and in lower-stakes situations where expert human judgement is uneconomic (for example, detecting possibly deceptive web pages or job applications).
Detecting deception from text using the Pennebaker Deception Model [6] is well-developed and accuracies are well above typical human levels [4] . The model was developed empirically but has been validated in a large number of real-world settings. Deception is characterized by four changes: first person singular pronouns decrease; negative emotion words increase; action verbs ("go", "run") increase; and exclusive words ("but", "or", "whereas") decrease. The model only applies to freeform text, where the speaker or author can express themselves in a unconstrained way.
In dialogues, and particularly in interrogations, there are several reasons to expect that the language used in a question will affect the language used in the response. The first is the technical necessities of each particular language: if a question asks "Did you . . . " then a responsive answer must use a first-person singular or plural pronoun ("I did . . . " or "we didn't . . . "), or a passive verb. The second is verbal mimicry: two people in conversation, even strangers, imitate each other unconsciously in facial expression and body language, volume, pitch, speech rates, and they also tend to mimic each other's words and phrases [1, 3] .
It is also known that the Pennebaker model is not directly effective in dialogues. Little and Skillicorn [7] showed that deception was characterized by increases in all four word categories, but were unable to provide a theoretical justification for why this should be so.
We therefore start with the following hypothesis: H1: Removing the effect of prompting from answers will improve the detection of deception by a respondent.
Our primary dataset, NUREMBERG, comprises tran- [2, 5] . The NUREMBERG dataset contained three subgroups: DEFENDANTS, Nazi war criminals, highly motivated to be deceptive, who were eventually found guilty on all counts and executed; UNTRUSTWORTHY, lower-ranking Nazis who were not (yet) themselves on trial but whose accounts might be moderately deceptive; and TRUSTWORTHY, Holocaust survivors or civilians reporting on conditions in Nazi-occupied countries with little reason to be deceptive. The NUREMBERG dataset contained 4159 question-answer pairs (1355 from DEFENDANTS, 1826 from UNTRUSTWORTHY, and 978 from TRUSTWORTHY) and a total of 311,099 words. Frequencies for the parts of speech listed in Table I were collected.
Empirical evidence suggested that any effect of prompting in a question dissipates by about 50 words into an answer. Conversely, in a sequence of short questions and answers, there is some evidence that prompting has an effect on more than the immediate response. In other words, the effect appears to be temporal, rather than derived from each speech act independently. Accordingly we aggregated or truncated as necessary to produce responses of lengths at least 50 words and no more than 500 words. We converted word frequencies into word rates by dividing each frequency by the total number of words in the question or answer in which it appeared.
Our technique for removing the effect of prompting is as follows:
1) Given a category of prompt words and response words, separate the set of answers into those where the corresponding questions contained one or more of the prompt words (the prompted set), and those where they did not (the unprompted set). 2) Fit a univariate Gaussian distribution to the unprompted set, and a bivariate Gaussian to the prompted set (the rates of response words versus prompt words).
3) Adjust the bivariate Gaussian so that it "matches" the position and size of the univariate Gaussian. This is done by moving the bivariate Gaussian to (0,0), rotating it by the smallest angle so that one of its axes lies along y = 0, and then rescaling it so that its vertical center lies at the same height as that of the univariate unprompted distribution, and its variance in the vertical direction matches that of the univariate distribution.
This alters the rates of prompted responses to estimate what they "would have been" without the effect of prompting, based on rates for unprompted answers. The effect for a sample answer is shown in Figure 1 . The rate of first-person singular pronouns in the example response shown as a blue point appears high relative to unprompted responses, but low relative to prompted ones. The correction suggests that, corrected, it is actually more than one standard deviation low. These corrections are performed in sequence for each question-word, answer-word pair. H1 predicts that the corrected data will show a sharper distinction between truth-tellers and liars than the original data. We performed singular value decomposition on the answer data, before and after correction, reducing the 6-category deception model to 3 dimensions, expecting that a scatter plot will show greater differentiation for the corrected data. Figure 2 that the effect is exactly the opposite of what H1 predicts -performing the correction erased most of the differentiation between the groups. These results indicate that H1 is false. More detailed analysis, separating each of the subgroups and looking their responses to prompting separately, suggested a surprising and important replacement hypotheses.
H2: The effect of prompting itself depends on whether the respondent is being deceptive or not. Figure 3 shows color maps reflecting the corrections applied to response word rates for the three subgroups independently. The differences between DEFENDANTS and UNTRUSTWORTHY (both of the Nazi subgroups) are not large, but the patterns of the TRUSTWORTHY subgroup are quite different. Figure 4 shows this in greater detail for two of the stronger prompt-response pairs. Different groups of witnesses are not simply being prompted at different rates (because of being asked different questions), or showing different rates of response independent of prompting (because they are different kinds of people, say). This provides strong evidence supporting H2. To explore the relationship of question words, response words, and subgroups, we trained a pair of random forests: one with the rates of only the six response word categories, and one with the rates of all stimulus and response word categories. For simplicity, we included only the DEFENDANTS and TRUSTWORTHY subgroups. Because not every statement by DEFENDANT is a lie, we did not expect high accuracy from either of these forests. Figure 5 shows the performance of these random forests. While the response-words-only random forest performed above chance, it showed a strong bias: its accuracy with TRUSTWORTHY was much lower than its accuracy with DEFENDANTS. Adding the question word rates improved overall accuracy by more than 10 percentage points -a more significant result than we expected -and reduced bias by an even larger amount, producing a huge improvement on the TRUSTWORTHY subgroup without reducing the accuracy on DEFENDANTS. (Of course, not every answer by a person we Random forests provide an estimate of variable importance by accumulating the information gain each time each attribute is chosen at an internal node of any tree. Table II shows importance estimation for the best-performing random forest. The most influential words in the question-and-answer random forest are first-person singular pronouns in responses and second-person pronouns in questions, with similar frequencies. The next three most important word categories are all question words, suggesting that the forest not only supplemented its reasoning with question words, but actually made more decisions based on question words than on response words. The Pennebaker deception model has been extensively applied. However, its requirement that textual data be freeform severely limits its application to setting such as lawenforcement interrogation and legal proceedings, where the ability to detect deception would have greater impact.
We have developed a technique for removing the prompting effect of the language of questions on the language of responses. This technique is of considerably usefulness more generally, since it can be used both to remove the effects of prompting or to measure them (for example, detecting off-line influence via on-line language).
This technique enabled us to falsify the seemingly obvious hypothesis, H1 -deception in dialogues is more subtle than simply removing the effect of the interrogator and using the standard Pennebaker model on the results. Surprisingly, it turns out that respondents are actively responding to the language of questions based on their own mental state. In particular, deceptive respondents tend to respond to several classes of prompting words at higher rates than those being truthful. These results explain those of Little and Skillicorn [7] . If responses are considered independently of questions, then increased rates of first-person singular pronouns and exclusive words are signals of deception precisely because, given similar rates of stimulus words across questions, those being deceptive will respond with higher rates in these categories. These results also suggest that interrogators should pay more attention to their own word choices. For example, using more secondperson pronouns amplifies the difference between deceptive and truthful responses.
If question words and response words are intertwined, then predicting deception will be easier and more accurate if both questions and answers are considered together. We have shown that this is possible using random-forest prediction resulting in substantial lifts in accuracy. Transcripts of Republican presidential debates in 2012 show similar prompting effects, and the same strategies of correction and prediction were applied to transcripts of the Simpson civil trial, showing similar, although somewhat weaker, results.
